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Relative Access to Corrective Speech: 
A New Test for Requiring 
Actual Malice 
Aaron Perzanowski† 
Introduction 
 The public figure doctrine has become an anachronism. Current First 
Amendment protections for defamation1 defendants are centered on a sim-
plistic and antiquated conception of the communications environment—
one that would appear quaint were it not so pernicious. This outmoded 
view of communications media cannot account for the dramatic democrati-
zation of the means of mass communication spurred by modern technol-
ogy. The dissimilarity between the contemporary communications 
environment and the media landscape that informed the public figure doc-
trine renders current First Amendment protections insufficient and reveals 
them as inconsistent with the very rationale that demanded their creation. 
 The basic First Amendment framework for defamation suits an-
nounced in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.2 has changed little in the interven-
ing decades.3 The Court’s consideration of defamation—a cause of action 
inseparably tied to the act of publication4—necessarily implicated its un-
derstanding of the means of mass communication. In 1974, “the media” 
was easily defined. Print publishers and broadcasters exhausted the uni-
verse of those capable of communicating to the masses.5 As a result, the 
                                                                                                                          
 Copyright © 2006 Aaron Perzanowski. The author hereby authorizes reproduction of this 
Comment subject to the Creative Commons Attribution-NoDerivs 2.5 License, the full terms of which 
can be accessed at http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/2.5/legalcode. 
 † J.D. Candidate, School of Law, University of California, Berkeley (Boalt Hall), 2006. Thanks 
to Deirdre Mulligan, Rory Eastburg, and Hartwell Harris for commenting on earlier drafts.  
 1. The term “defamation” refers to the torts of libel and slander. W. Page Keeton, Prosser 
and Keeton on Torts § 111, at 771 (5th ed. 1984). While libel is the publication of false and 
defamatory matter in writing, print, or other fixed representation, slander is the oral publication of such 
material. Id. Matter is deemed defamatory if it tends to harm the reputation of its subject. Id. 
 2. 418 U.S. 323 (1974). Gertz extended the actual malice fault requirement—the standard 
applied a decade earlier to public official plaintiffs in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 
(1964)—to suits brought by public figures. See infra notes 50-53 and accompanying text.  
 3. Subsequent Supreme Court decisions have addressed questions left unanswered by Gertz, but 
the basic structure of the public figure analysis remains substantially unaltered. See infra note 54.  
 4. See Keeton, supra note 1.  
 5. See infra note 109 and accompanying text.  
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Court crafted the public figure test with a relatively homogeneous class of 
defendants in mind. By looking only to the public or private status of the 
plaintiff in determining the appropriate degree of fault, the public figure 
doctrine assumes equality among media defendants. 
 Although the public figure test remained substantially unaltered in the 
three decades since its formulation, technological developments facilitated 
sweeping changes in the means of mass communication. New technolo-
gies, most notably the internet, democratized communication in ways in-
conceivable to the Gertz Court. Irrespective of the volume of information6 
and speed of delivery7 offered by internet communication, this technology 
fundamentally altered our ability to communicate. Unlike the media of the 
1970s, the internet allows users to contribute as publishers to its vast re-
pository of content and as participants in the global conversation it makes 
possible. Where traditional media allowed for one-to-many distribution of 
information,8 the internet facilitates many-to-many communication.9 On 
the internet, for better or worse, each of us can have our say.10 
                                                                                                                          
 6. A 2003 study estimated that the internet included 532, 897 terabytes of data. Peter Lyman 
& Hal R. Varian, How Much Information? 2003: Executive Summary 11 (Oct. 30, 2003), 
http://www.sims.berkeley.edu/research/projects/how-much-info-2003/printable_report.pdf. In contrast, 
the entire printed collection of the Library of Congress could be stored in just 10 terabytes. Id. at 3. 
 7. As of 2005, nearly thirty-eight million lines provided high speed internet access (defined as 
200 kilobits per second or higher) to residential and business customers. Press Release, Federal 
Communications Commission, Federal Communications Commission Releases Data on High-Speed 
Services for Internet Access (July 7, 2005), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/ 
attachmatch/DOC-259870A1.pdf. 
 8. One-to-many distribution is characterized by “masses of silent, shuffling consumers” who 
passively absorb information without interacting with each other or the source of that information. 
Jonathan Zittrain, The Rise and Fall of Sysopdom, 10 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 495, 496 (1997). Traditional 
broadcasting and publishing are paradigmatic examples of one-to-many communication, but some 
internet applications operate under the one-to-many model as well. For instance, web pages often 
exhibit the characteristics of one-to-many media. Id. These sites merely transfer the traditional 
newspaper or billboard advertisement to the digital environment, retaining the limitations of one-to-
many communication.  
 9. See David G. Post, Pooling Intellectual Capital: Thoughts on Anonymity, Pseudonymity, and 
Limited Liability in Cyberspace, 1996 U. Chi. Legal F. 139, 162 (1996). Many-to-many 
communications media allow users to both contribute and receive information. Blogs, file sharing, and 
Wikis are among the current many-to-many applications. See Many-to-Many, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Many-to-many&oldid=40318680 (last visited Sept. 5, 2005). 
In a broad sense, the world wide web, because of its low barriers to participation, functions as a many-
to-many medium.  
 10. Internet distribution enables a potentially global readership, but the voice the internet offers is 
in part a theoretical one. In terms of visibility, operators of independent websites often share more in 
common with street corner pamphleteers than The New York Times. Blogs, for example, vary widely in 
their readership. The Volokh Conspiracy, a group blog authored by a number of law professors, attracts 
as many as 230,000 hits each week. Posting of Eugene Volokh to The Volokh Conspiracy, 
http://volokh.com/posts/1130175621.shtml (Oct. 24, 2005, 1:40pm). Other blogs, such as For God and 
For Cheese, which received 395 hits in December of 2005, garner more modest audiences. See For God 
and For Cheese, http://forgodandcheese.blogspot.com/2006/01/my-faithful-readers.html (Jan. 16, 2006, 
4:54pm).  
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 Internet speech gives rise to a communications environment of un-
precedented diversity. The average citizen—previously confined to the 
one-to-one methods of distributing information—enjoys a potential global 
audience on the internet. Web sites, blogs,11 Usenet,12 and other vehicles of 
internet speech extended communicative power previously vested solely in 
the hands of a small group of publishers and broadcasters to the public. 
Now these traditional media players must compete not only with each 
other, but also with citizens who once merely constituted their audience.13 
This complex taxonomy of potential defamation defendants simply sur-
passed the Gertz Court’s capacity for imagination. 
 The pairing of a radically new communications environment with le-
gal rules frozen in a previous era is bound to create conflict. Emerging le-
gal threats against bloggers help illustrate the difficulty of shoehorning 
contemporary internet speakers into the current First Amendment frame-
work. In one recent example,14 Traffic Power, a company that claims to 
increase the search engine rank of its customers, filed a defamation suit 
against Aaron Wall, the operator of a blog focusing on search engine opti-
mization technology.15 Although the complaint failed to specify the par-
ticular posts containing the allegedly defamatory material, Traffic Power 
                                                                                                                          
 11. Blogs are websites consisting of periodic articles typically arranged in reverse chronological 
order. These articles, or posts, are typically authored by a single contributor or small group of 
contributors, but readers often add comments to these posts. While blogs are accessible through any 
web browser, blog posts are often available distributed in RSS, Atom, and XML formats which allow 
readers to view posts in specialized blog reading software called aggregators. Blog, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Many-to-many&oldid=40318680 (last visited Sept. 5, 2005). 
“Blog” is an abbreviation of “weblog,” a term coined on the Robot Wisdom WebLog. See Robot 
Wisdom WebLog, http://www.robotwisdom.com/log1997m12.html (Dec. 17-29, 1997). 
 12. Usenet is one of the oldest computer network communications systems still in wide use. 
Users read and post email-like messages, called articles, to a number of distributed newsgroups. 
Whereas email may be used for one-to-one communication, however, Usenet is a many-to-many 
medium. See Usenet, http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Usenet&oldid=41288869 (last visited 
Sept. 5, 2005). 
 13. See Lucas Graves, Everyone’s a Reporter, Wired, Sept. 2005, at 30, available at 
http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/13.09/start.html?pg=2. 
 14. This example is far from an isolated one. Irish blogger Gavin Sheridan received a demand 
letter from the attorneys of Men are from Mars, Women are from Venus author Dr. John Gray 
after Sheridan suggested that Gray fabricated his educational credentials. See Gavin’s Blog, 
http://www.gavinsblog.com/mt/archives/000533.html (Nov. 17, 2003); Letter from David M. Given, 
Phillips, Erlewine & Given LLP, to Gavin Sheridan (Mar. 9, 2004), available at 
http://www.gavinsblog.com/Graylegalthreat.pdf. In another example, a failed Brownsville, Texas City 
Commission candidate known as “Captain Bob” was the subject of a libel suit for accusing his 
opponent’s wife of cocaine abuse on his campaign blog. Sergio Chapa, Capt. Bob Sued for Blog 
Content, The Brownsville Herald, Aug. 26, 2005, available at http://www.brownsvilleherald.com/ 
ts_more.php?id=66731_0_10_0_C. Another recent suit pitted town councilman Patrick Cahill against 
anonymous authors of blog comments that referred to the councilman’s alleged “character flaws” and 
“obvious mental deterioration.” Cahill v. Doe, 879 A.2d 943, 946 (Del. Super. Ct. 2005). 
 15. See Seobook, http://www.seobook.com/archives/001130.shtml#more (Aug. 26, 2005) 
(including transcription of complaint filed by Traffic Power). 
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claimed that both Wall and anonymous readers who posted comments on 
his site were liable for defamation.16  
 Aside from the issue of liability for publishing comments authored by 
third parties,17 current defamation doctrine draws no distinction between 
bloggers like Aaron Wall and traditional media outlets like The New York 
Times or CNN. The standard of fault is based on the plaintiff’s status as a 
public figure, and without reference to the characteristics of the defendant 
publisher. As a result, the current First Amendment framework accounts 
for variety among plaintiffs but ignores diversity among possible defen-
dants. 
 Although traditional publishers often spawn internet counterparts,18 
most internet publishers are easily distinguished from traditional media 
sources. Disparities in financial resources, perceived reliability, and popu-
larity are among the most obvious differences between CNN and Aaron 
Wall—but those same distinctions can be drawn between traditional media 
as well.  
 Thus, in the defamation context, the most significant and legally rele-
vant difference between traditional one-to-many and many-to-many inter-
net media is the putative defamation victim’s ability to respond. If The 
Washington Post prints false accusations about Jane Doe, short of publish-
ing her own newspaper, at best she can ask for a correction or hope another 
news source will correct the Post’s mistake. But if a Wikipedia19 or blog 
post publishes those same accusations, often her easiest and most effective 
strategy is simply to correct the misinformation through her own re-
sponse.20 In the time it would take to contact a lawyer, she could compose a 
response that would counter the misinformation and prevent or repair any 
harm to her reputation. 
 The public figure doctrine fails to account for access to means of cor-
rective speech so prevalent on the internet. But ironically, the ability to 
respond to defamatory speech served as a central consideration in the crea-
tion of the public figure test.21 Because public figures enjoyed access to the 
media, they were better equipped to combat defamatory falsehoods.  
Therefore, higher standards of recovery were justified.  
                                                                                                                          
 16. Id. 
 17. As discussed infra Part V, 47 U.S.C. § 230 offers operators of “interactive computer 
services” (including blogs) immunity from liability for publishing content authored by third parties. 
 18. See Top 20 Global News Web Sites for November, Editor & Publisher Mag., Dec. 16, 
2005, LEXIS, Nexis Library, Editor & Publisher Magazine File.  
 19. See infra note 173 and accompanying text. 
 20. For one telling anecdotal comparison of the ease of correcting misinformation published in 
traditional one-to-many and many-to-many media, see Cory Doctorow, Correcting the 
Record: Wikipedia vs. The Register, BOING BOING, Jan. 11, 2006, http://www.boingboing.net/2006/ 
01/11/correcting_the_recor.html (last visited Jan. 23, 2006). 
 21. See infra Part III.B.  
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 In order to remain faithful to the rationale that informed the Court’s 
balancing of reputational integrity and uninhibited debate, a new test for 
requiring actual malice is needed to account for the cacophony of internet 
speech. This new test should consider not only the variations among plain-
tiffs that account for their ability to respond to defamation. It must also 
reflect sensitivity to the increased diversity among defamation defendants 
and the concomitant variety of corrective speech opportunities. 
 This article proceeds as follows: Part I summarizes the evolution of 
the constitutional treatment of defamation. It also examines the framework 
developed in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan and the Court’s efforts to 
modify that standard in subsequent cases to adequately balance the inter-
ests in reputational integrity and free speech. Part II isolates the principles 
that guided the Court in fashioning the constitutional balance struck in its 
defamation decisions and argues that access to self-help through corrective 
speech provides the primary justification for the current framework. Part 
III identifies the factual assumptions underlying the current public figure 
doctrine and argues that in the age of many-to-many communication these 
assumptions no longer strike an appropriate balance between reputational 
harm and First Amendment principles. Part IV suggests that the broad im-
munity to defamation claims established by § 230 of the Communications 
Decency Act was a prescient recognition of the need to adapt defamation 
law to reflect new developments in communication technology. Finally, 
Part V outlines a proposal that looks to the relative availability of correc-
tive speech in determining whether a plaintiff must demonstrate actual mal-
ice and explore its application and potential difficulties. 
I 
The Constitutional Law of Defamation 
 Prior to the Supreme Court’s 1964 decision in New York Times Co. v. 
Sullivan, defamation was a constitutional backwater. The Court repeatedly 
denied any constitutional protection for defamatory speech.22 In the pre-
Sullivan era, “the punishment of [libel] ha[d] never been thought to raise 
any Constitutional problem.”23 Because libelous publications were “not . . . 
within the area of constitutionally protected speech,”24 defamatory state-
ments were subject to strict liability—“in the same class with the use of 
explosives or the keeping of dangerous animals.”25 With its decision in  
Sullivan, the Court parted with the long-standing tradition of strict liability 
                                                                                                                          
 22. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957); Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 266 
(1952); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 715 (1931). 
 23. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942). 
 24. Beauharnais, 343 U.S. at 266. 
 25. William L. Prosser, Handbook Of The Law Of Torts 773 (4th ed. 1971). 
838  CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 94:833 
libel, fundamentally reshaping defamation liability and triggering a consti-
tutional debate that would continue for a decade.  
A. The Origin of Constitutional Privilege: Sullivan 
 In March 1960, the New York Times printed a full-page advertise-
ment—intended to garner attention and support for the civil rights move-
ment—describing a series of abuses perpetrated against student protesters 
and progressive civic leaders.26 In response to the ad, L.B. Sullivan, an 
elected Commissioner of Montgomery, Alabama, filed a libel suit against 
the newspaper and four clergymen who endorsed the ad.27 Alabama law 
recognized absolute truth as the only defense to libel per se.28 The Supreme 
Court of Alabama upheld a $500,000 jury award in Sullivan’s favor.29  
 In reversing the Alabama decision, the Supreme Court of the United 
States held that even defamatory speech warranted the protection of the 
First Amendment.30 The Court, analogizing to the Sedition Act of 1798,31 
recognized robust and uninhibited debate of political concerns as “a  
fundamental principle of our constitutional system” necessary for self-
governance.32 The Court understood that because “erroneous statement is 
inevitable in free debate,”33 truth alone is an inadequate defense to libel.34 
Strict liability defamation would prompt those who wish to question and 
criticize public officials to “steer far wider of the lawful zone” out of fear 
of civil liability.35 The Court concluded that such a rule, because it failed to 
provide the breathing space necessary for free expression, was inconsistent 
with the First Amendment.36 
 But Sullivan did not grant unconditional immunity for speech critical 
of official conduct.37 Instead the Court crafted a new standard of fault in 
                                                                                                                          
 26. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 256-58 (1964). 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. at 267. 
 29. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 273 Ala. 656 (1962), rev’d, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
 30. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 272-73. 
 31. The Sedition Act imposed criminal penalties against those who “write, print, utter, or publish 
. . . any false, scandalous and malicious writing or writings against the government of the United States 
. . . with intent to defame . . . .” and allowed only truth as a defense. Sedition Act, ch. 74, § 2, 1 Stat. 
596 (1798). From its inception, many condemned the Sedition Act as unconstitutional because it 
restricted debate and criticism of government officials in clear violation of the First Amendment. 
Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 274-76. While this derision failed to prompt Congress to repeal the Act or the 
Court to strike it down, “the attack upon its validity has carried the day in the court of history.” Id. at 
276. President Jefferson pardoned those convicted under the Act and remitted their fines, discounting 
the Act as “a nullity.” Id. 
 32. Id. at 269 (quoting Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931)). 
 33. Id. at 271. 
 34. Id. at 278. 
 35. Id. at 279 (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958)). 
 36. Id. at 271-73. 
 37. Justices Black and Goldberg, in two concurring opinions joined by Justice Douglas, 
demanded such a categorical privilege. Black argued that the Constitution granted “an absolute 
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defamation suits brought by public officials over criticism of their per-
formance of official duties. In such cases, the Court required plaintiffs to 
demonstrate that the defendant’s statement was made with knowledge that 
it was false or with reckless disregard for its falsity.38 This actual malice39 
test—adapted from the standard developed in numerous state courts40—
served as the first extension of constitutional protection to defamatory 
speech and marked the starting point for the standard developed in subse-
quent decisions.  
B. Extending the Reach of Constitutional Privilege: Curtis and 
Rosenbloom 
 In the companion cases Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts and Associated 
Press v. Walker, the Court held that First Amendment protection extended 
to defamatory statements concerning public figures as well as public offi-
cials.41 While the constitutional privilege for defamatory speech unques-
tionably grew broader, ambiguity remained regarding the precise definition 
of “public figures” as well as the level of the protection for publications 
defaming such figures. Justice Harlan’s opinion premised recovery by 
those who thrust themselves into the vortex of a public controversy or pos-
sessed “access to the means of counterargument”42 on a showing of “highly 
unreasonable conduct constituting an extreme departure from the  
standards” of responsible publishers.43 In his concurring opinion, Chief 
Justice Warren required public figures, defined as those “intimately  
involved in the resolution of important public questions,”44 to demonstrate 
actual malice rather than highly unreasonable conduct.45 The Court’s in-
ability to settle on a single standard for requiring actual malice contributed 
to its reformulation of the doctrine just four years later. 
                                                                                                                          
immunity for criticism of the way public officials do their public duty.” Id. at 295. Further, he 
contended “an unconditional right to say what one pleases about public affairs is what I consider to be 
the minimum guarantee of the First Amendment.” Id. at 297. 
 38. Id. at 280. 
 39. The Court defined “actual malice” as “knowledge that [the statement] was false or with 
reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.” Id. This specialized use of the term differs from the 
common law usage, which defined “actual malice” as a state of mind—often ill will or spite—that gave 
rise to a loss of qualified privilege. See Keeton, supra note 1, § 115, at 833.  
 40. See, e.g., Ponder v. Cobb, 126 S.E.2d 67, 80 (N.C. 1962); Lawrence v. Fox, 97 N.W.2d 719, 
725 (Mich. 1959); Stice v. Beacon Newspaper Corp., 340 P.2d 396, 400-02 (Kan. 1959); Bailey v. 
Charleston Mail Ass’n, 27 S.E.2d 837, 844 (W. Va. 1943); Salinger v. Cowles, 191 N.W. 167, 174 
(Iowa 1922); Snively v. Record Publ’g Co., 198 P. 1, 3-5 (Cal. 1921); McLean v. Merriman, 175 N.W. 
878 (N.D. 1920). 
 41. 388 U.S. 130, 155 (1967). 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 164. 
 45. Id. at 163-64. 
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 In Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., the Court addressed constitutional 
protections for speech that defamed private individuals.46 The plurality 
opinion, authored by Justice Brennan, held that actual malice was required, 
even in cases brought by private individuals, if the statements involved 
matters of public concern.47 Rosenbloom—in part because of the social and 
economic power resting in the hands of private individuals48—shifted focus 
from the public figure status of the plaintiff to the subject matter of the al-
legedly defamatory speech.49 In so doing, the Court expanded protection 
afforded defamatory statements well beyond the bounds established just 
seven years earlier in Sullivan. 
C. Refocusing on the Plaintiff’s Public Status: Gertz 
 Just three years after Rosenbloom, the Court returned to the issue of 
First Amendment protections for defamatory speech in Gertz v. Robert 
Welch, Inc. The Gertz Court abandoned the Rosenbloom public interest 
test,50 in large part adopting the rationale of Justice Harlan’s Rosenbloom 
dissent.51 According to the Court, public officials or figures suing for 
defamation must demonstrate actual malice, but states remain free to de-
termine the liability standard in cases brought by private citizens so long as 
they require some degree of fault.52 Gertz marked a return to determining 
the necessary degree of fault on the basis of the plaintiff’s public status 
rather than the public’s interest in the controversy. Further, Gertz resolved 
any lingering uncertainty stemming from the Curtis Court’s reliance on the 
highly unreasonable conduct test and clarified the class of public figures.53 
With the exception of limited modifications of constitutional privilege in 
later cases,54 the Gertz standard still defines contemporary First  
Amendment protection for defamatory speech. 
                                                                                                                          
 46. 403 U.S. 29, 31 (1971). 
 47. Id. at 52. 
 48. Id. at 41-42 (quoting Curtis Publ’g, 388 U.S. at 163-64 (Warren, C.J., concurring in result)). 
 49. Id. at 52. 
 50. 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974). 
 51. 403 U.S. at 68-70 (Harlan, J. dissenting). See James J. Brosnahan, From Times v. Sullivan to 
Gertz v. Welch: Ten Years of Balancing Libel Law and The First Amendment, 26 Hastings L.J. 777, 
789 (1975). 
 52. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 347. 
 53. Those who “occupy positions of such persuasive power and influence” may be “deemed 
public figures for all purposes,” while those who “thrust themselves to the forefront of particular public 
controversies” gain public status for that limited purpose. Id. at 345. 
 54. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985) (permitting 
recovery of presumed and punitive damages absent a showing of actual malice in private plaintiff suits 
when the defamatory statements do not involve matters of public concern); Phila. Newspapers v. 
Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 777 (1986) (holding that the burden of showing falsity falls on the plaintiff in an 
action to prove defamation involving speech of public concern). 
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II 
Justifications for the Public Figure Standard 
 The Court struggled to strike an appropriate balance between unin-
hibited debate and protecting the reputational interests of individuals,55 but 
ultimately settled on the framework discussed above. While, broadly 
speaking, the democratic necessity of open discourse provided the primary 
thrust for developing such a balance,56 two distinct rationales informed the 
particular solution chosen by the Court: the voluntary nature of public 
status and the access to media enjoyed by public persons. This Part traces 
the influence of these two rationales in the Court’s defamation decisions 
and argues that media access serves as the primary motivation and justifi-
cation for the current actual malice framework. 
A. Public Life as Assumption of Risk 
 Those in positions of public notoriety—whether government officials, 
business leaders, or celebrities—typically achieve that status voluntarily.57 
The choice to assume positions of prominence opens public figures and 
officials to greater media scrutiny and thus weakens their claim to protec-
tion from reputational harm. 
 Although the Sullivan Court failed to directly address the voluntary 
nature of public status, this consideration complements the Court’s analy-
sis. Because the Court limited application of the actual malice standard to 
public officials criticized for their performance of official duties,58 the as-
sumption that those subject to the Court’s standard were witting partici-
pants to public scrutiny hardly required noting.59 Thus, the Sullivan Court’s 
silence on the issue of willing participation in public life is unremarkable 
given the class of plaintiffs the decision contemplates. 
 The voluntary risk rationale began to take form in Curtis, although the 
precise implications of an individual’s voluntary public status remained 
unclear. In establishing Walker as a public figure subject to the short-lived 
                                                                                                                          
 55. See, e.g., Gertz, 418 U.S. at 342. 
 56. Id. at 340; Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270. 
 57. The Court recognized the possibility that some public figures may gain that status against 
their will; however, it presumed such involuntary public figures would be “exceedingly rare.” Gertz, 
418 U.S. at 345. In one example of this rare class of public figures, a Georgia court held that accused 
Olympic bomber Richard Jewell qualified as “an involuntary limited-purpose public figure.” Atlanta 
Journal-Constitution v. Jewell, 555 S.E.2d 175, 186 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001); see Clay Calvert & Robert D. 
Richards, A Pyrrhic Press Victory: Why Holding Richard Jewell Is a Public Figure Is Wrong and 
Harms Journalism, 22 Loy. L.A. Ent. L. Rev. 293 (2002). 
 58. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279-80. 
 59. The vast majority of public officials voluntarily come into their positions of responsibility. 
Elected officials, judicial, diplomatic, and administrative appointees, and bureaucratic employees freely 
assume their responsibility. Military conscription presents some possibility of involuntary public 
officials, but even then, given the length of service necessary to elevate a conscript to a position of 
sufficient influence to achieve that status, some voluntary recommitment to military service would 
likely prove necessary.  
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“highly unreasonable conduct” standard,60 the Court explained that Walker 
had thrust himself into the “‘vortex’ of an important public controversy.”61 
Although the Court suggested that Walker’s voluntary engagement in pub-
lic affairs rendered him a public figure, it failed to clarify the significance 
of his deliberate involvement in balancing his reputational interest against 
First Amendment considerations. 
 In his Rosenbloom dissent62—the opinion that eventually formed the 
basis of the Court’s Gertz decision63—Justice Harlan voiced the first clear 
statement of the relevance of voluntary public status, “public personalities . 
. . may be held to have run the risk of publicly circulated falsehoods . . . .”64 
In Justice Harlan’s estimation, voluntary involvement in matters of public 
concern amounted to an assumption of risk warranting reduced libel pro-
tection for the plaintiff. As a result, “the need to provide monetary com-
pensation for defamation appears a good deal more attenuated.”65  
 Three years later, writing for the Gertz majority, Justice Powell ech-
oed Justice Harlan’s reasoning, citing the “compelling normative consid-
eration” that public officials and public figures “run[] the risk of closer 
public scrutiny” by “assum[ing] roles of special prominence in the affairs 
of society” as justification for requiring public figures to show actual mal-
ice.66 Even in the “exceedingly rare” circumstance in which a public figure 
emerged against her will, the Court explained that the media are entitled to 
presume her voluntary participation in public affairs.67 
 This “assumption of risk” reasoning contributed significantly to the 
current actual malice framework. The Court understood that to enter public 
life is to forego some protection from media scrutiny, including defama-
tion. But, as discussed infra, the “assumption of risk” rationale serves as 
neither the sole nor the primary justification for insisting on actual malice 
in cases brought by public figures. 
B. Public Status as Access to Media 
 The second, and, as this Comment will demonstrate, dominant ration-
ale for the public figure doctrine is that public officials and public figures, 
by virtue of their power and renown, command significant media attention. 
This attention enables them to redress the harms inflicted by defamatory 
publications through corrective speech. As a result, the balance shifts  
                                                                                                                          
 60. See Curtis Publ’g, 388 U.S. at 155. 
 61. Id. 
 62. 403 U.S. at 62-78 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 63. See Brosnahan, supra note 51. 
 64. Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 70. 
 65. Id. at 71. 
 66. 418 U.S. at 344-45. 
 67. Id. at 345. 
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toward less stringent enforcement of defamation law in favor of robust 
public debate. 
 Although it does not lend direct support to the media access rationale, 
the landmark Sullivan decision foreshadowed later developments. While 
the Sullivan majority did not rely on public officials’ access to means of 
response in requiring actual malice, the Court demonstrated sensitivity to a 
plaintiff’s ability to speak in determining appropriate liability standards. 
The Court reasoned that because public officials enjoyed unlimited immu-
nity from defamation claims,68 the right of the public to criticize such offi-
cials must be similarly unrestrained.69 The Court implicitly embraced the 
notion that when a plaintiff’s speech opportunities are great, barriers to 
judicial relief must be more substantial.  
 Although the Sullivan majority failed to directly address the access to 
media rationale, Justice Goldberg’s concurrence relied in part on the im-
portance of corrective speech.70 An absolute privilege to criticize public 
officials, Justice Goldberg argued, would not eliminate all remedies for the 
defamed because “[u]nder our system of government, counterargument and 
education are the weapons available to expose these matters, not abridg-
ment . . . of free speech . . . .”71 
 In subsequent cases, the Court’s reliance on this justification became 
explicit. In Curtis, the Court reasoned that since Plaintiff Butts enjoyed 
access to the means of counterargument,72 he could likely redress any harm 
caused by the allegedly defamatory speech, thereby lessening his need for 
protection. And while the Rosenbloom plurality discounted access to media 
as a factor overly subject to the whims of the press,73 Justice Harlan’s dis-
sent continued to stress the importance of “access to channels of communi-
cation sufficient to rebut falsehoods” in determining the appropriate 
standard in defamation suits.74 
 In Gertz, the majority adopted Harlan’s media access rationale, aban-
doning the public interest test formulated in Rosenbloom.75 In doing so, the 
Gertz Court clarified the media access justification for the actual malice 
requirement:  
The first remedy of any victim of defamation is self-help—using 
available opportunities to contradict the lie or correct the error and 
thereby to minimize its adverse impact on reputation. Public  
officials and public figures usually enjoy significantly greater  
                                                                                                                          
 68. See Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 575 (1959). 
 69. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 282.  
 70. Id. at 304-05 (Goldberg, J., concurring). 
 71. Id. (quoting Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 389 (1962)). 
 72. 388 U.S. at 154. 
 73. 403 U.S. at 46. 
 74. Id. at 70. 
 75. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.  
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access to the channels of effective communication and hence have 
a more realistic opportunity to counteract false statements than  
private individuals normally enjoy.76 
The media access rationale offers a more compelling justification for re-
quiring actual malice. 
C. Media Access as the Dominant Rationale 
 Both the voluntary risk and media access rationales figured promi-
nently and with equal frequency in the Court’s development of the con-
temporary constitutional defamation framework. In fact, the Gertz Court 
referred to the assumption of risk rationale as the more important of the 
two.77 Nonetheless, this Comment argues that the availability of self-help 
through corrective speech provides stronger justification for demanding a 
showing of actual malice. First, the media access rationale, unlike the as-
sumption of risk justification, weighs on both sides of the balance between 
protecting reputation and promoting speech. Second, the media access ra-
tionale finds support in the First Amendment’s preference for self-help. 
1. Media Access as a Thumb on Both Scales of the Constitutional Balance 
 The balance between protecting reputational integrity and securing 
uninhibited discussion shifts in favor of increased burdens on defamation 
plaintiffs in two ways. As the defamation victim’s claim to protection de-
creases, heightened standards for recovery become more appropriate. This 
allows more space for expression. The scales tip further in favor of higher 
hurdles to recovery when more exacting standards promote independent 
First Amendment values. Since the media access rationale influences the 
balance by both methods, it offers stronger support for requiring actual 
malice. 
 In weighing the protection of reputation with the preservation of free 
debate, the Court understood that because the majority of public figures 
gained that status by choice, the interest in protecting the reputations of 
these figures is less compelling. The voluntary risk rationale shifts the bal-
ance between reputational harm and unfettered debate unquestionably in 
the direction of heightened standards of liability. It does so not by directly 
enhancing First Amendment values, but by weakening the public figure 
plaintiff’s claim to protection.  
 The media access rationale, because it weighs on both scales of the 
constitutional balance, provides a justification of more fundamental impor-
tance. Just as assumption of risk lessens the interest in guarding against 
harmful false statements, the availability of corrective speech renders 
defamation judgments less necessary to ensure reputational integrity. But 
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access to counterspeech does more than simply reduce the vulnerability of 
public figures to libel and slander: it furthers the values espoused by the 
First Amendment. Corrective speech contributes to robust public debate.78 
As Judge Learned Hand explained, the First Amendment “presupposes that 
right conclusions are more likely to be gathered out of a multitude of 
tongues . . . .”79 By not only allowing, but strongly encouraging, those criti-
cized by alleged defamers to respond, the imposition of actual malice spurs 
this “multitude of tongues.” Therefore, media access militates against the 
public figure’s interest in protection from defamation while simultaneously 
advancing independent First Amendment principles.  
2. Media Access as Self-Help 
 The media access rationale finds support in the preference for self-
help expressed in American legal tradition. Where private action can 
eliminate or reduce harms, the law often encourages the wronged party to 
engage in self-help before calling for state intervention. In contract claims, 
for example, plaintiffs are barred from recovering damages that they were 
capable of mitigating.80 Trademark owners who fail to police their marks 
risk losing protection.81 Trade secret law extends protection only to those 
who take reasonable measures to guard valuable information.82  
 But nowhere is the preference for self-help more explicit than in the 
First Amendment context.83 In evaluating content-based restrictions on 
speech, courts look to the availability of self-help in determining both the 
existence of a compelling state interest and in establishing whether that 
interest was satisfied by the least restrictive means.84 The Supreme Court’s 
decision in Cohen v. California provides the most vivid example of an in-
stance where self-help can undermine a claimed compelling interest.85 
Cohen was convicted of engaging in offensive conduct86 for wearing a 
                                                                                                                          
 78. See Douglas Lichtman, How the Law Responds to Self-Help, Berkeley Center for Law and 
Technology, Paper 1 (2005), http://repositories.cdlib.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1004& 
context=bclt (discussing the preference for self-help in intellectual property and First Amendment law). 
 79. United States v. Assoc. Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943), aff’d, 326 U.S. 1 
(1945). 
 80. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 350 (1979). 
 81. See J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition §§ 
3:10, 18:42 (4th ed. 1996). 
 82. See Uniform Trade Secrets Act § 1(4) (1985), 14 U.L.A. 433; Roger M. Milgrim, Milgrim 
on Trade Secrets § 1.04 (2005). 
 83. See Tom W. Bell, Free Speech, Strict Scrutiny, and Self-Help: How Technology Upgrades 
Constitutional Jurisprudence, 87 Minn. L. Rev. 743, 744 (2003). 
 84. Id. at 745-46. 
 85. Cohen, 403 U.S. 15 (1971); see also Consol. Edison Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 
530, 542 (1980) (invalidating the Public Service Commission’s regulation prohibiting the inclusion of 
printed materials discussing controversial issues in monthly utility bills because customers could 
“transfer the bill insert from envelope to wastebasket”). 
 86. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 15 (quoting Cal. Penal Code § 415, which prohibits “maliciously and 
willfully disturb[ing] the peace or quiet of any neighborhood or person . . . by . . . offensive conduct”).  
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jacket, meant to protest the Vietnam War, adorned with the phrase “Fuck 
the Draft.”87 The Court reversed, reasoning that those offended by Cohen’s 
expression “could effectively avoid further bombardment of their sensibili-
ties simply by averting their eyes.”88 The availability of self-help thus di-
minished the state’s interest in restricting Cohen’s speech. 
 More recently, the Court employed self-help to demonstrate the avail-
ability of less restrictive means of addressing the government’s compelling 
interest in restricting speech.89 In Reno v. ACLU, the Court upheld a First 
Amendment challenge to the Communications Decency Act (CDA),90 
which criminalized the transmission of indecent material to minors.91 The  
Court deemed the law overbroad because it chilled protected speech 
online.92 In reaching this conclusion, the Court stressed the importance of 
alternative means of achieving the compelling state interest in protecting 
minors from harmful online speech.93 The Court pointed to the district 
court’s findings that “user-based software suggests that a reasonably effec-
tive method by which parents can prevent their children from accessing 
sexually explicit and other material which parents may believe is inappro-
priate for their children will soon be widely available.”94 Here, even the 
prospective availability of filtering software promised an adequate self-
help remedy that weighed against governmental interference with the free 
flow of internet communications. The Court in Ashcroft II, upholding a 
preliminary injunction preventing the enforcement of the Child Online Pro-
tection Act,95 reiterated its conviction that filtering can provide an adequate 
self-help mechanism.96  
 The central role of the media access rationale in determining the ap-
propriate level of protection for defamatory speech is fitting, given the im-
portance of self-help alternatives in evaluating restrictions on speech. But 
while the cases discussed above demonstrate that the ability to avoid offen-
sive speech through self-help can be sufficient to prevent state interference, 
self-help plays a different role in the defamation context. Because defama-
tion harms its victim not by the victim’s own exposure to the speech, but 
by the exposure of that speech to third parties,97 avoidance proves an insuf-
ficient self-help mechanism. Instead, defamation requires corrective speech 
capable of counteracting the harm caused by the defamer. Only by  
                                                                                                                          
 87. 403 U.S. 15, 16 (1971). 
 88. Id. at 21. 
 89. Bell, supra note 83, at 762-69. 
 90. For further discussion of the CDA, see infra Part V. 
 91. See 47 U.S.C. § 223 (1996). 
 92. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 882 (1997). 
 93. Id. at 879. 
 94. Id. at 877 (quoting ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 842 (E.D. Pa. 1996)). 
 95. 47 U.S.C. § 231 (1998). 
 96. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 702 (2004). 
 97. Keeton, supra note 1, at § 113. 
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correcting any damaging misconceptions resulting from defamatory state-
ments can this sort of reparative speech provide an adequate means of self-
help.  
 The argument for this variety of self-help—critical to the Gertz deci-
sion and our current First Amendment defamation framework—finds its 
roots in an opinion that pre-dates Cohen. In his concurrence in Whitney v. 
California, Justice Brandeis gave voice to the underlying principle of the 
corrective self-help approach: “If there be time to expose through discus-
sion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of  
education, the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced  
silence.”98 This call for counterspeech represents more than a judicial pref-
erence. As Professor Tribe explained, “whenever ‘more speech’ could 
eliminate a feared injury, more speech is the constitutionally mandated 
remedy.”99  
 The current actual malice rule presumes that countering defamation 
with corrective speech will reduce the harm caused by published false-
hoods; at least one study supports that assumption.100 Public figures, be-
cause of their greater access to the means of mass communication, are 
better equipped to utilize corrective speech to redress these harms. The 
practical and constitutional significance of this sort of counterspeech bol-
sters the claim that the media access rationale serves as the central justifi-
cation for the public figure doctrine. 
 Although the voluntary risk rationale addresses important normative 
concerns that lessen the claim to protection of public figures, the media 
access rationale—rooted in the First Amendment’s preference for counter-
speech—offers the more compelling justification for requiring actual mal-
ice because it both lessens the need for protection and furthers the First 
Amendment values central to the Court’s effort to reform defamation law.  
III 
The Public Figure Doctrine as a Product of One-to-Many Media 
 While the media access and voluntary risk rationales provide the pri-
mary justifications for the current public figure doctrine, the Court’s under-
standing of the media unmistakably influenced the precise formulation of 
the constitutional treatment of defamatory speech. By focusing on the 
Court’s conception of the media during the decade between Sullivan and 
Gertz, a picture of a doctrine inextricably tied to outdated assumptions 
emerges. This section first examines those assumptions and their influence 
on the public figure standard. Next, it demonstrates the ways in which  
                                                                                                                          
 98. 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
 99. Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 12-8, at 603 (1978). 
 100. See Clay Calvert, Harm to Reputation: An Interdisciplinary Approach to the Impact of Denial 
of Defamatory Allegations, 26 Pac. L.J. 933 (1995). 
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recent technological developments undermined those assumptions and the 
test they informed. 
A. The Court’s Media Assumptions 
 The Court’s assumptions about the media unquestionably influenced 
its formulation of First Amendment protections for defamatory speech em-
bodied in the public figure doctrine. The Court envisioned defamation de-
fendants—publishers and broadcasters—who fit squarely within the 
archetype of traditional media. Further, the Court relied on an understand-
ing of the communications environment that presumed the continued 
dominance of one-to-many media in determining the content of public de-
bate. 
 The Gertz Court likely understood the defamation framework it an-
nounced as one limited to traditional media defendants.101 Although subse-
quent case law suggests a broader application of the public figure 
doctrine,102 the Gertz Court focused unquestionably on media defendants, 
discussing the impact of the actual malice standard on “communications 
media,”103 “press and broadcast media,”104 “publishers,”105 and  
“broadcasters.”106 Even in Gertz, the Court cast its holding in terms particu-
larly applicable to media defendants—”the States may define for  
themselves the appropriate standard of liability for a publisher or  
broadcaster of defamatory falsehood injurious to a private individual.”107 In 
crafting the public figure doctrine, the Court conceptualized a particular 
sort of defamation defendant, and as a result, the principle announced in 
Gertz is one deeply rooted in the nature of the press.108  
                                                                                                                          
 101. See Brosnahan, supra note 51, at 792-93. 
 102. Some courts refused to apply the Gertz standard to non-media defendants in suits brought by 
private plaintiffs. See, e.g., Greenmoss Builders v. Dun & Bradstreet, 461 A.2d 414 (Vt. 1983), aff’d on 
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 106. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 341, 343, 350, 366, 369. 
 107. Id. at 347.  
 108. Brosnahan, supra note 51; Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Silencing John Doe: Defamation & 
Discourse in Cyberspace, 49 Duke L.J. 855, 861-62 (2000). 
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 Not only did Gertz assume “the media” would be the recipient of the 
protection offered by the public figure doctrine, but the Court also had a 
clear conception of the characteristics shared by those media defendants. In 
the mid-1970s when Gertz was decided, media defendants shared a reli-
ance on one-to-many means of communication. One-to-many communica-
tion, as its name implies, describes a method of sharing information by 
which one party disseminates material to an audience. Newspapers, televi-
sion, and radio epitomize one-to-many communications. In each of these 
media, a centralized source is responsible for the creation and distribution 
of information to a large and typically passive audience of consumers. 
Aside from one-to-one communication like individual letters, phone calls, 
and conversations, the one-to-many communication employed by the me-
dia defendants envisioned in Gertz offered the only option for disseminat-
ing information in the 1970s. 
 As a result of their use of one-to-many communication, the media 
shared a number of common traits. First, they were relatively few in num-
ber.109 Both economic and physical constraints limited the number of pub-
lishers and broadcasters. The prohibitive expense of the technology 
necessary to engage in one-to-many communication prevented the vast ma-
jority of Americans from taking advantage of its communicative power. 
The physical constraints of spectrum scarcity and the resulting governmen-
tal regulation of spectrum allocation further limited the broadcast media.110 
The effects of these constraints were most conspicuous in the television 
industry, which in the 1970s was dominated by just three networks that 
distributed the vast majority of programming.111 While radio broadcasters 
and print publishers faced lower barriers to entry, these media outlets were 
in similar short supply.112  
 Second, traditional media defendants exerted considerable influence 
over the content of public debate. As a result of their extensive reach and 
limited number, media outlets—both collectively and individually—were 
able to regulate public exposure to information and shape public opinion. 
The broadcasters and publishers of the 1970s were particularly  
                                                                                                                          
 109. In 1970 just 862 local television stations, dominated by three networks, operated in the 
United States. David Demers, Media Concentration in the United States 12-13 (2001), 
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well-situated in their ability to communicate to the American public. By 
the 1970s—five hundred years after the Gutenberg press launched a new 
era in the dissemination of information113—the possibilities of one-to-many 
communication had almost been fully realized. The American media indus-
tries extended the reach of one-to-many communications to unprecedented 
levels.114 And since the ability to reach these audiences was concentrated in 
the hands of a relatively small number of corporations, the Court rightly 
assumed that the whims of media interest influenced the content of public 
discourse.115  
 Thus, the public figure doctrine was devised in the era of centralized, 
concentrated, and powerful one-to-many media. This reality exerted an 
undeniable influence on creation of the public figure doctrine. The access 
to media rationale offers public figures less protection from defamation 
because they are better able to attract attention of the fickle media that de-
termine the content of public attention and discussion. Further, because the 
Court constructed a framework that assumed one-to-many media defen-
dants, the public figure test looks only to the status of the plaintiff in de-
termining the appropriate degree of fault. Since the Court assumed that the 
defendant was among the one-to-many media—a class with well-defined 
and relatively uniform characteristics—the Court saw no need to determine 
the communicative power of the defendant. While these assumptions about 
communications media may have appropriately informed the standard for 
requiring actual malice in the 1970s, subsequent developments in commu-
nications technology call the viability of these assumptions into question.  
B. Assumptions Undermined 
 In many ways, the assumptions that influenced the Court’s decisions 
still hold true today. Concentrated ownership and resource scarcity con-
tinue to limit the viewpoints expressed in many popular media.116 Public 
figures, in part because of our celebrity-obsessed culture, still have greater 
access to mainstream media outlets. Our modes of information exchange, 
however, have changed in fundamentally important respects. While the 
majority of Americans still rely on traditional one-to-many media like  
                                                                                                                          
 113. See Printing Press, http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Printing_press&oldid= 
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television and newspapers,117 technological change fostered an era of un-
precedented access to the means of mass communication. Many-to-many 
communication is steadily displacing the one-to-many communication cen-
tral to the public figure doctrine.118 
 No technology embodies this trend better than the internet. As its 
popularity exploded in the mid-1990s, this global communications network 
provided its users with a wealth of easily accessible information. The inter-
net presents a unique opportunity for open discourse to flourish, allowing 
anyone capable of accessing information to publish their own globally 
available content. The Reno Court explained: 
First, [the internet] presents very low barriers to entry. Second, 
these barriers to entry are identical for both speakers and listeners. 
Third, as a result of these low barriers, astoundingly diverse  
content is available on the Internet. Fourth, the Internet provides 
significant access to all who wish to speak in the medium, and even 
creates a relative parity among speakers.119  
Unlike traditional print publication, burdened by economic barriers to mass 
publication, or broadcast media, bound by both economic obstacles and 
spectrum scarcity, the internet provides a medium in which everyone with 
access can speak. Online publishers include “government agencies,  
educational institutions, commercial entities, advocacy groups, and  
individuals.”120 This democratization of publishing profoundly affects the 
way we share information. On the internet “any person with a phone line 
can become a town crier with a voice that resonates farther than it could 
from any soapbox. Through the use of Web pages, mail exploders, and 
newsgroups, the same individual can become a pamphleteer.”121 
 The many-to-many communication enabled by the internet under-
mines the assumptions central to the public figure doctrine.122 When  
                                                                                                                          
 117. See John Horrigan et al., Pew Internet & American Life Project, The Internet 
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one-to-many communication offered the only means to reach the public, 
identifying those with the ability to widely disseminate information pre-
sented a relatively simple task; but as individuals began to contribute to the 
marketplace of ideas through the internet, the line between citizen and me-
dia blurs. On Usenet, message boards, and listservs,123 individuals have 
long engaged in publicly accessible conversations, simultaneously serving 
as both speaker and audience. With the advent of blogs, the distinction be-
tween audience and news source becomes an increasingly elusive one.124 In 
the words of professional reporter turned citizen journalist Dan Gillmor, 
“technology has given us a communications toolkit that allows anyone to 
become a journalist at little cost and, in theory, with global reach.”125  
 Apple Computer’s recent efforts to subpoena the records of Mac-
related blogs to identify Apple insiders who allegedly disclosed informa-
tion in violation of non-disclosure agreements put the contemporary strug-
gle to define “the media” on the front pages of both newspapers126 and RSS 
aggregators.127 The sites in question allowed readers to contribute tips on 
upcoming Apple products or other Mac-related news.128 When one such 
site announced an unreleased product, Apple filed suit against the unknown 
informants and sought identifying information from the site’s email pro-
vider.129 The bloggers operating the site opposed Apple’s subpoena,  
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 126. See, e.g., Dan Fost, Legal Status of Bloggers Debated, Journalists’ Shield Claimed in 
Response to Apple’s Lawsuit, S.F. Chron., Mar. 8, 2005, at A1. 
 127. See Apple Subpoenas, Sues Over Leaks, Slashdot, Dec. 22, 2004, http://apple.slashdot.org/ 
article.pl?sid=04/12/22/195239&tid=141&tid=179&tid=3%20; Alex Wexelbat, Are Bloggers 
Journalists?, Copyfight, Feb. 4, 2005, http://www.corante.com/copyfight/archives/ 
2005/02/04/are_bloggers_journalists.php; Peter Rojas, Apple Sues Think Secret for Reading Pages from 
Their Diary, Engadget, Jan. 5, 2005, http://engadget.com/entry/ 
1234000383026207/. 
 128. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Doe 1, No. 1-04-CV-032178 at 2 (Cal. Super. Ct. Mar. 11, 2005), 
available at http://www.eff.org/Censorship/Apple_v_Does/20050311_apple_decision.pdf. 
 129. Id. 
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arguing that as journalists they could not be compelled to reveal the iden-
tity of their confidential sources.130 While the Superior Court denied the 
bloggers motion for a protective order, it acknowledged that “[d]efining 
what is a ‘journalist’ has become more complicated as the variety of media 
has expanded.”131 
 Since courts apply the public figure doctrine to non-media defen-
dants,132 the difficulty in defining the media does not preclude the doc-
trine’s application to cases involving internet speech. But to the extent that 
many-to-many media create variety among those speakers with access to 
means of mass communication—variety the Gertz Court neither considered 
nor predicted—the uniform treatment of defamation defendants should be 
questioned. The public figure doctrine assumes relative equality among 
defamation defendants, failing to distinguish between those whose com-
munication with the public is actual rather than potential, constant rather 
than occasional, and pervasive rather than specialized. The complex taxon-
omy of potential defamation defendants has surpassed the Gertz Court’s 
imagination. The standard that Court crafted, while resting on justifications 
of continued importance, cannot accommodate the variety of speakers in 
today’s marketplace. 
 Not only has the era of many-to-many communications challenged the 
Court’s assumptions about who serves the function of the press, it also 
calls into question the Court’s view of the primary significance of main-
stream media in defining public debate. From Senator Trent Lott’s decades 
late endorsement of segregationist presidential candidate Strom  
Thurmond133 to CBS’s reliance on forged memos that claimed to show 
President Bush shirked his National Guard duties during Vietnam,134 blog-
gers have demonstrated an ability to shape the national debate. No longer 
do the whims of the mainstream media as understood by the Gertz Court 
limit the public’s exposure to information. While access to media remains 
a fundamental consideration in determining the appropriate level of protec-
tion for defamatory speech, the simplistic public figure test is unlikely to 
fully capture the rich set of factual scenarios under which defamation suits 
now arise. 
 As the first mode of many-to-many communication, the internet did 
more than simply blur the distinctions between audience and media or  
                                                                                                                          
 130. Id. at 8. 
 131. Id. 
 132. See supra note 102. 
 133. Talking Points Memo, http://www.talkingpointsmemo.com/archives/000479.php (Dec. 10, 
2002, 11:18pm EDT); Noah Shachtmar, Blogs Make the Headlines, Wired, Dec. 23, 2002, 
http://www.wired.com/news/culture/0,1284,56978,00.html. 
 134. Scott Johnson, The Sixty-First Minute, Power Line, Sept. 9, 2004, http://powerlineblog.com/ 
archives/007760.php; John Borland, Bloggers Drive Hoax Probe into Bush Memos, CNET, Sept. 10, 
2004, http://news.com.com/Bloggers†rive+hoax¶robe+into£ush+memos/2100-1028_3-5362393.html. 
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citizen and journalist. It reshaped the way information is shared, challeng-
ing the assumptions about the means of mass communication central to the 
Court’s defamation decisions. Because the media no longer provides the 
sole means of mass communication, and because we can no longer reliably 
or sensibly define who constitutes the media, the current defamation 
framework requires reexamination.  
IV 
Section 230: A Reflection of Changing Conditions 
 In 1996, as the internet emerged as a powerful and popular communi-
cation tool,135 Congress enacted a law that shielded providers of “interac-
tive computer services” and their users from liability for publishing 
defamatory speech created by third parties.136 Properly interpreted, § 230 
demonstrates a rejection of common law doctrine137 in favor of a rule tai-
lored to current circumstances. As the only instance in which Congress 
explicitly recognized the need to alter defamation law to accommodate 
internet speech, § 230 serves as the first, but ultimately inadequate, step 
toward a treatment of defamation that reflects the exigencies of internet 
communication. 
A.  The Origins of Section 230 
 In the mid-1990s the legislature and the public grew concerned about 
children’s access to objectionable material online.138 Two distinct ap-
proaches to remedying this concern emerged. The first, embodied in a bill 
that became the Communications Decency Act (CDA), sought to impose 
steep criminal penalties on those who used the internet to display or trans-
mit indecent material to minors.139 However, many legislators worried that 
the federal policing of the internet called for by the CDA would fail to curb 
                                                                                                                          
 135. A year earlier, in 1995, online dial-up services such as America Online and CompuServe 
began providing internet access, eventually bringing the internet into millions of American homes. 
Nerds 2.0.1 Timeline, 1990-1998, http://www.pbs.org/opb/nerds2.0.1/timeline/90s.html (last visited 
Nov. 1, 2005). 
 136. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (1996). 
 137. At common law “every one who takes part in the publication, as in the case of the owner, 
editor, printer, vendor, or even carrier of a newspaper is charged with publication.” Keeton, supra note 
1, § 133, at 799. 
 138. Much of this concern can be traced to a July, 1995 Time Magazine cover story on the 
dangers of internet pornography. See Philip Elmer-DeWitt, On a Screen Near You: Cyberporn, Time, 
July 3, 1995, at 38. This story, which made its way to the Senate floor, relied heavily on a flawed study 
conducted by a Carnegie Mellon undergraduate student that claimed over 80% of the images on the 
internet were pornographic in nature. Andrew L. Shapiro, Liebling’s Revenge: The Power of 
Interactivity, http://www.mediachannel.org/originals/shapiro-liebling.shtml (last visited Apr. 11, 2006). 
 139. S. 314, 104th Cong. (1996), 47 U.S.C. § 223(a)(1)(B), (d)(1)(A-B) (1997), invalidated by 
Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997). 
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children’s access to objectionable content.140 Moreover, they feared the 
legislation would interfere with protected speech between adults, endanger-
ing the online forum for free discourse then developing.141 In response to 
what these legislators saw as the overzealous and unconstitutional tack of 
the CDA,142 the House passed the Internet Freedom and Family Empower-
ment Act,143 eventually codified in 47 U.S.C. § 230.144  
 With § 230, legislators hoped to reconcile the two seemingly conflict-
ing interests: protecting children from indecent material and preserving the 
Internet’s speech-enhancing characteristics. To spur the market-driven de-
velopment of filtering tools and self-regulatory policies, § 230 removed a 
legal stumbling block to voluntary efforts to monitor and regulate content. 
A developing body of libel case law created uncertain liability for services 
that monitored and removed content created by others.145 By attempting to 
remove or limit potentially defamatory or indecent material available 
                                                                                                                          
 140. See Elizabeth Corcoran, Legislation to Curb Smut On-Line Is Introduced, Wash. Post, July 
1, 1995, at F2. 
 141. As then Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich commented:  
I think that the Amendment . . . by Senator Exon in the Senate will have no real meaning and 
have no real impact and in fact I don’t think will survive. It is clearly a violation of free 
speech and it’s a violation of the right of adults to communicate with each other. I don’t agree 
with it and I don’t think it is a serious way to discuss a serious issue, which is, how do you 
maintain the right of free speech for adults while also protecting children in a medium which 
is available to both?  
Progress Report (National Empowerment Television broadcast), Gingrich Says CDA is “a clear 
violation of free speech rights,” http://www.cdt.org/speech/cda/950620ging_oppose.html (last visited 
Nov. 1, 2005). 
 142. Representative Goodlatte urged his colleagues in the House to adopt the Internet Freedom 
and Family Empowerment Act because unlike the CDA, it “[did not] violate free speech or the right of 
adults to communicate with each other.” 141 Cong. Rec. H8460, 8471 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995) 
(statement of Rep. Goodlatte). 
 143. The Internet Freedom and Family Empowerment Act was also known as the Cox-Wyden 
Amendment. Id. 
 144. Although the CDA and § 230 offered competing visions, Congress enacted them both. 
Despite the unconstitutionality of the indecency provisions in the CDA, see Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 
844, 885 (1997), § 230 remains intact. 
 145. Two cases motivated Congress’ action—Stratton Oakmont v. Prodigy and Cubby v. 
CompuServe. In Stratton Oakmont, Prodigy, which “held itself out to the public and its members as 
controlling the content of its computer bulletin boards” and “implemented this control through its 
automatic software screening program,” was held liable for publishing messages posted by others to its 
computer bulletin boards. Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 1995 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 229, 
*10 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1995). According to the court, the establishment of a monitoring policy designed 
to limit offensive content exposed Prodigy to libel actions for all 60,000 messages posted to its service 
each day, regardless of whether Prodigy had actual or constructive knowledge of the libelous posts. Id. 
at *13. 
 In Cubby, the court equated CompuServe’s online forums, including electronic bulletin boards, to 
an “electronic, for-profit library,” concluding that while CompuServe might decline to carry a given 
forum, it had little editorial control over the forum’s content once it was accepted. Cubby, Inc. v. 
CompuServe, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135, 140 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). On this basis, the court concluded that 
CompuServe could only be liable for publication where it had actual or constructive knowledge. Id. at 
141. The Cubby court, however, found no evidence of actual or constructive knowledge triggering such 
liability. Id. 
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through their services, online service providers exercised the sort of edito-
rial control likely to increase their liability. To eliminate this disincentive, 
§ 230 provided blanket immunity from causes of action stemming from the 
publication of third-party created content,146 dramatically altering the law 
of defamation as a means of stimulating self-regulation for a broad range of 
objectionable content.  
B. The Application of Section 230 
 Although § 230 avoided the speech-inhibiting pitfalls of the CDA, 
judicial interpretation of the statute threatened to render it a nullity. Despite 
unanimous precedent interpreting § 230 immunity broadly, two recent 
California Court of Appeal decisions have attempted to narrow the applica-
tion of the statute in a manner inconsistent with the policy goals of the 
statute. 
 In Zeran v. America Online, Inc., the first in a long line of cases inter-
preting § 230 broadly, the Fourth Circuit held that the proper scope of 
§ 230 abrogated all civil liability for the online publication of content au-
thored by third parties.147 Zeran filed suit after AOL failed to remove mes-
sages from its bulletin board—authored by a third party posing as Zeran—
that advertised t-shirts mocking the Oklahoma City bombing.148 AOL ar-
gued that § 230 provided immunity for its publication;149 Zeran contended 
that § 230 permitted recovery under a theory of “distributor liability.”150 At 
common law, publishers were subject to strict liability,151 but distributors, 
because of their limited editorial control, faced liability only if they pos-
sessed knowledge of the defamatory nature of the statement.152 Since Zeran 
notified AOL of the posts, he argued it possessed the requisite knowl-
edge.153 
 The court held that § 230 immunized service providers and their users 
from all liability for the online publication of third party content.154 The 
court explained that “publisher”—a term of art in the defamation con-
text155—included both primary publishers and distributors, or secondary 
                                                                                                                          
 146. Section 230 provides in part that “[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer service 
shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content 
provider.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1)(2000). The statute’s broad immunity did not extend to criminal 
behavior or to infringements of intellectual property. § 230(d)(1)&(2).  
 147. 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997). 
 148. Id. at 329. 
 149. Id. at 330. 
 150. Id. at 331. 
 151. See Prosser, supra note 25, at 773 (“The effect of this strict liability [for defamatory 
publications] is to place the printed, written, or spoken, word in the same class with the use of 
explosives or the keeping of dangerous animals.”). 
 152. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 581. 
 153. Zeran, 129 F.3d at 331. 
 154. Id. at 332. 
 155. Keeton, supra note 1, at § 113. 
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publishers.156 More importantly, the court reasoned that imposing liability 
on the basis of actual or constructive knowledge would thwart the self-
regulation Congress intended the statute to spur.157 
 Prior to the California Court of Appeal’s decision in Barrett v.  
Rosenthal, every court to evaluate § 230 followed Zeran.158 The Barrett 
court parted with the well-established consensus and excluded “distributor 
liability” from the scope of § 230 immunity.159 
 In Barrett, a message authored by a third party and posted by defen-
dant Rosenthal to a Usenet group allegedly defamed Barrett.160 When Bar-
rett demanded that Rosenthal remove the post, she refused, and Barrett 
filed suit.161 Rosenthal then moved for dismissal pursuant to California’s 
Anti-SLAPP162 statute, relying on immunity under § 230.163 The Superior 
Court struck the libel claim, and Barrett appealed.164  
 Abandoning the well-settled interpretation of § 230, the Court of  
Appeal held that defamation liability premised on actual or constructive 
knowledge survived the statutory immunity clause.165 The court, relying 
heavily on legislative silence166 and a misconstrual of the statute’s  
                                                                                                                          
 156. “Those who are in the business of making their facilities available to disseminate the writings 
composed, the speeches made, and the information gathered by others may also be regarded as 
participating to such an extent in making the books, newspapers, magazines, and information available 
to others as to be regarded as publishers.” Zeran, 129 F.3d at 332 (quoting Keeton, supra note 1, at 
803).  
 157. Id. at 333. 
 158. See, e.g., Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1026 (9th Cir. 2003); Green v. America Online, 
318 F.3d 465, 469, 471 (3d Cir. 2003); Ben Ezra, Weinstein, & Co. v. America Online Inc., 206 F.3d 
980, 983, 986 (10th Cir. 2000); Smith v. Intercosmos Media Group, Inc., U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24251, *2, 
9, 10-11 (E.D. La. 2002); Patentwizard, Inc. v. Kinko’s, Inc., 163 F. Supp. 2d 1069, 1071 (D.S.D. 
2001); Morrison v. America Online, Inc., 153 F. Supp. 2d 930, 934 (N.D. Ind. 2001); Blumenthal v. 
Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 51-52 (D.D.C. 1998); Gentry v. eBay, Inc., 99 Cal. App. 4th 816, 831, 833 
n.10, 835 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002); Kathleen R. v. City of Livermore, 87 Cal. App. 4th 684, 692, 695 n.3, 
& 696-97 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001); Doe One v. Oliver, 755 A.2d 1000, 1003-04 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2000); 
Doe v. America Online, Inc., 783 So. 2d 1010, 1012-17 (Fla. 2001); Barrett v. Fonorow, 799 N.E.2d 
916, 922-26 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003); Schneider v. Amazon.com, Inc., 31 P.3d 37, 38-41 (Wash. Ct. App. 
2001). 
 159. Barrett v. Rosenthal, 114 Cal. App. 4th 1379, 1410 (2004). 
 160. Id. at 1384. 
 161. Id. 
 162. California, among other states, enacted a statute to expeditiously strike complaints in 
“lawsuits brought primarily to chill the valid exercise of the constitutional rights of freedom of speech 
and petition,” also known as strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPP). See Cal. Code 
Civ. Proc. § 425.16. 
 163. Barrett, 114 Cal. App. 4th at 1395. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. at 1410. 
 166. The court inexplicably assumed that the absence of an explicit congressional rejection of the 
distributor liability standard applied but not satisfied in the Cubby case evidenced a congressional intent 
to retain the secondary publisher (distributor) standard of liability after § 230. Id. at 1395. 
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purpose,167 contended that immunity from distributor liability could not 
further the goals of § 230.168 According to the court, under Zeran, “ISPs 
will not bother to screen their content at all because they will never be sub-
ject to liability.”169 Ignoring the purpose of § 230, the court reasoned that 
imposing liability for “neglecting to monitor information or failing to re-
move objectionable content that is brought to their knowledge,” would 
provide a strong incentive to regulate content.170 Barrett is currently on 
appeal before the California Supreme Court.171 
C. An Incomplete Solution 
 The arguments for a narrow interpretation of § 230 ignore both the 
practical fallout of notice-based liability and the Congressional intent to 
establish additional barriers to liability for the publication of third party 
content online. The narrowing of immunity called for by Barrett creates 
virtually unchecked incentives for private removal of protected speech.172 
                                                                                                                          
 167. The court asserted that liability was a necessary incentive for monitoring and removing 
objectionable content by service providers, despite a clear congressional desire to eliminate such 
liability as a means to achieve that same end. See id. at 1403. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Barrett, 114 Cal. App. 4th at 1403 (quoting Sewali K. Patel, Note, Immunizing Internet 
Service Providers from Third-Party Internet Defamation Claims: How Far Should Courts Go?, 55 
Vand. L. Rev. 647, 684 (2002). 
 170. Id. 
 171. Barrett v. Rosenthal, 87 P.3d 797 (Cal. 2004). 
 172. Under a narrowed reading of § 230, the economics of content removal are dispositive. While 
removing content is free—both in terms of costs and potential exposure—preserving free speech online 
requires costly investigation, legal analysis, and uncertain liability. This incentive for content removal 
risks abuse by those who wish to silence critical or unpopular speech, regardless of its truth. By 
submitting bad-faith notification to a provider, an individual can all but ensure the removal of speech 
regardless of its truth, reducing the Barrett court’s liability rule to a heckler’s veto. 
 Given the incentives created by a narrow reading of § 230, reasonable actors will immediately 
remove allegedly defamatory speech without regard to the merits of the notification. While the 
considerable costs of investigation, in terms of both actual expenditures and increased liability, weigh 
heavily in favor of removal, no significant costs are associated with the removal of allegedly 
defamatory material. Removal requires neither factual inquiry nor legal expertise; nor does removal 
give rise to potential liability. Section 230 shields providers from liability for their removal of content 
“whether or not such material is constitutionally protected.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2). This protection, 
coupled with the threat of litigation and the high costs of investigation, all but guarantees that providers 
will remove speech upon notice.  
 In the United Kingdom, the standard of liability for online defamation is nearly identical to the 
narrow reading of § 230 announced in Barrett. In order to avoid liability, a provider of third party 
content must show that they “did not know, and had no reason to believe, that what he did caused or 
contributed to the publication of a defamatory statement.” Defamation Act, 1996, c. 31, § 1(c) (Eng.). 
In response, the trade association for internet service providers in the UK advises its members to 
expeditiously remove allegedly defamatory material in order to avoid liability. According to the 
Internet Service Providers’ Association (ISPA) UK’s Compliance Guidance Scheme for Online 
Defamation “[t]here is almost never a good business reason” not to remove allegedly defamatory 
speech after receiving notice. ISPA UK, Compliance Guidance Scheme for Online Defamation, 
http://www.ispa.org.uk/html/legal_forum/compliance%20guidance%20scheme/040506%20Defamation
.html. (last visited April 21, 2006). 
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Moreover, it reduces § 230 to a merely symbolic congressional gesture by 
failing to appreciably alter the existing state of the law.173  
 A narrowing of § 230 immunity—despite its inconsistency with statu-
tory text, legislative history, and sound policy—has been recently bolstered 
by errors published in Wikipedia,174 a freely editable internet encyclopedia. 
After journalist and First Amendment advocate John Seigenthaler discov-
ered inaccuracies implicating him in the assassination of Robert Kennedy 
in a Wikipedia entry,175 some suggested that Wikipedia should be held li-
able for the content authored by its users.176  
 After Seigenthaler complained,177 Wikipedia promptly corrected the 
gaff, demonstrating precisely why liability for third party content is both 
unnecessary and antithetical to the further development of many-to-many 
media. If Wikipedia faced liability for the accidental or malicious mis-
statements authored by its thousands of users, the vast and unpredictable 
threat of defamation judgments would undermine the viability of its mis-
sion to create a forum in which information is free for all to both consume 
and produce. Moreover, the ease of correcting false information on sites 
like Wikipedia178 signals the need for further adjustments of defamation 
law in the age of many-to-many communication. 
 Far from extending too much protection to internet speech, § 230, 
even broadly construed, offers at best an incomplete solution to the strains 
on traditional defamation law created by many-to-many communication. 
                                                                                                                          
 173. Congress—presumably well aware of the state of defamation law—enacted § 230 as a means 
of recasting liability for internet publication of third party content. As Representative Cox explained 
when he introduced the legislation, “what we want are results. We want to make sure we do something 
that actually works.” 141 Cong. Rec. H8460 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995) (statement of Rep. Cox). But if § 
230 permits liability premised on actual or constructive knowledge, Congress accomplished almost 
nothing. The statute would offer little if any additional protection in cases where actual malice is 
required. Plaintiffs unable to show that the defendant “knew or had reason to know” of the defamatory 
nature of their publication would likely prove unable to establish actual malice. The subjectivity of the 
actual malice requirement offers the only ground for distinguishing it from constructive knowledge. 
Actual malice requires that the “defendant realized that [his] statement was false or that he subjectively 
entertained serious doubt as to the truth of his statement.” Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, 466 U.S. 
485, 511 (1984). Constructive knowledge imposes an objective rather than subjective test. Given the 
likely reluctance of a jury to credit a claim that a defendant—who objectively should have known of a 
statement’s falsity—did not subjectively doubt the truth of his publication, this distinction is unlikely to 
offer much in the way of additional protection. Nor would this cramped interpretation of § 230 
appreciably raise the hurdle for private defamation plaintiffs who need only prove negligence. A 
defendant who is negligent with regard to his publication is necessarily one with “reason to know” of 
its falsity. Under the Barrett court’s interpretation of § 230, Congress’ effort to reshape defamation on 
the internet was nearly meaningless.  
 174. See http://en.wikipedia.org/. 
 175. John Seigenthaler Sr., http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=John_Seigenthaler_Sr.& 
oldid=35321784 (last visited Jan.16, 2006). 
 176. See Posting of Aaron Perzanowski to bIPlog, http://boalt.org/biplog/archives/638 (Dec. 12, 
2005, 4:37am) (discussing the viewpoint of Doug Lichtman, as well as others, who make this 
argument). 
 177. Seigenthaler, supra note 175. 
 178. See Doctorow, supra note 20. 
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While the statute severely cabins liability for publishing libelous comments 
authored by third parties—offering significant legal protection for bloggers 
like Aaron Wall179—it does not address the larger difficulty of a communi-
cations environment that has outgrown the assumptions of the public figure 
doctrine. That problem implicates not only third party content, but material 
authored by the defendant as well.  
 Many-to-many media providers that publish third party content typi-
cally provide the greatest opportunity for corrective speech by potential 
defamation victims. So while § 230 was not crafted to accommodate the 
counterspeech-facilitating nature of these media, the ease of response asso-
ciated with them supports the policy outcome of a broad immunity under 
§ 230. Nonetheless, the question of the appropriate standard of liability for 
the author of a message posted via such a medium remains unanswered. 
Therefore, if the availability of means of response is to remain a dominant 
consideration in determining the appropriate barriers to recovery, further 
changes are necessary to bring defamation jurisprudence in line with tech-
nological reality. 
V 
Imposing Actual Malice on the Basis of Access to  
Corrective Speech 
 The broad principle motivating § 230—that developments in commu-
nication technologies demand refinements in defamation law—extends 
beyond its application to third party content. The existence of many-to-
many modes of communication requires a re-examination not only of li-
ability for content authored by others, but for primary defamation liability 
as well.  
 Intuitively, internet communication challenges our notions about the 
necessity of strong legal protections against defamatory speech. In a case 
like Barrett where the allegedly defamatory speech is posted to a publicly 
accessible forum, the putative victim’s most immediate and effective re-
sponse is often not to file a lawsuit, but instead to refute the defamer’s mis-
statements. In many instances, the internet offers an ideal vehicle for this 
sort of counterspeech. Often the victim can respond almost immediately 
with equal visibility in the same forum, simultaneously addressing both the 
author and the audience of the defamatory statements, thus preventing or 
correcting any reputational injury. This sort of counterspeech provides “a 
day in court that you can have over and over again, and it normally comes 
cheap,”180 obviating the need for lawsuits. Furthermore, counterspeech and 
                                                                                                                          
    179.     Seobook, supra note 15. 
 180. Mike Godwin, Cyber Rights 89 (2003). 
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legal rules that encourage it create an environment hospitable to the open 
debate favored by the First Amendment and promised by the internet.181 
 The potential ease of response offered by internet speech, coupled 
with the arcane assumptions about the media central to the Court’s defama-
tion decisions, leave the current actual malice framework out of step with 
the realities of modern communication. While a new approach to the con-
stitutional treatment of defamation is necessary, any proposed standard 
must recognize that although conditions have changed, the ultimate inter-
ests at stake remain unaltered. The difficulty in crafting acceptable stan-
dards for defamation remains in the balancing of individuals’ interests in 
maintaining reputational integrity against society’s interest in free speech. 
The standard described below attempts to apply the central rationale of the 
current defamation framework in a manner that can accommodate techno-
logical developments, both past and future. 
 This Part first outlines the basic considerations that comprise the pro-
posed relative access test. Next, it describes the application of the proposed 
test to a number of hypothetical defamation disputes. Finally, it anticipates 
some potential criticisms of the relative access test. 
A. The Relative Access Test 
 Rather than imposing the actual malice requirement—demanding that 
plaintiffs demonstrate that the defendant published with knowledge of fal-
sity or reckless disregard for the truth of a statement—on the basis of status 
as a public figure, courts should look to the plaintiff’s relative access to 
corrective counterspeech to determine whether the actual malice standard 
is appropriate.182 Courts should require actual malice when plaintiffs enjoy 
access to some means of communication that, when compared to the de-
fendant’s publication, are likely to provide an adequate means of response. 
Unless a substantial imbalance in the parties’ abilities to communicate to 
the relevant audience would prevent self-help, actual malice should be re-
quired.  
                                                                                                                          
 181. Of course, the ease and effectiveness of self-help varies greatly on the internet. Some internet 
media lend themselves to corrective speech more so than others. While Usenet, message boards, and 
blog comments may allow an immediate response visible to the relevant audience, other vehicles of 
internet speech do not lend themselves to such direct means of correction. Websites like 
www.nytimes.com—the online counterpart of The New York Times—do not typically allow for direct 
response to their publications. Counterspeech would have to take place in another forum, and given the 
widespread popularity of the site, only a defamation victim with access to a similarly high traffic 
internet publication would reasonably be able to counter the false publication. The variation among 
internet media is accounted for by the test outlined infra. 
 182. Although this proposed standard replaces the public figure test for actual malice, it is not 
intended to alter the law of defamation in any other respect. It does not limit common law defenses 
such as truth and opinion, nor is it intended to alter immunity for the publication of third party content 
established by § 230 or the application of actual malice to lawsuits brought by public officials. 
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 The relative access test I propose is deeply rooted in the Court’s 
defamation jurisprudence. As this Comment contends, the primary justifi-
cation for requiring heightened standards for recovery in suits brought by 
public figures is the access to the means of corrective speech those with 
public status enjoy. But with many-to-many communications, even the av-
erage citizen can often respond with equal voice in the marketplace of 
ideas, obviating the need for special protections from the potential harms of 
defamation. The negligence standard for defamation recovery, while once 
necessary to protect citizens from harm, now threatens to function as an 
unnecessary burden on the free exchange of information. By weighing the 
impact of defamatory speech against the plaintiff’s ability to respond, the 
relative access standard would limit recovery subject to negligence to those 
cases where—because of significant inequities between speakers—there 
are likely to be failures in the marketplace of ideas. Further, such a test not 
only would look to the plaintiff’s status, but also to the power of the defen-
dant. This would eliminate the presumed equality among defamation de-
fendants implicit in the current public figure doctrine, and would allow 
courts leeway to be more sensitive to context when determining defamation 
liability standards. 
 In determining relative access to corrective speech, courts should con-
sider four factors: (1)  respective means of communication,  (2)  relative 
notoriety,  (3)  access to the relevant audience, and  (4)  efforts to engage in 
or permit counterspeech. These factors, none of which should be disposi-
tive in isolation, would require careful balancing by courts. 
 First, the court should compare the medium of distribution employed 
by the defendant to those available to the plaintiff. Disparities in modes of 
communication present perhaps the most formidable barrier to corrective 
speech. Alleged defamers with access to traditional means of one-to-many 
communication such as newspapers or television—because of the perva-
siveness and perceived reliability of those media—currently enjoy more 
influence than defamation plaintiffs whose sole response mechanism is a 
newsgroup or personal website.183 This imbalance in favor of the defendant 
weighs against applying the actual malice standard. Conversely, when the 
plaintiff’s means of counterspeech are more powerful than those of the de-
fendant or when the parties exhibit relative parity in available media, coun-
terspeech presents a more realistic option to counteract reputational harm. 
Both parties to a dispute over defamatory statements made on a publicly 
accessible Usenet group, for example, can utilize equivalent forms of 
communication, thus tipping the scales in favor of the application of actual 
malice.  
                                                                                                                          
 183. The current dominance of certain modes of distribution should not enshrine a hierarchy of 
communications media. Consideration of the means of communication employed by the parties must 
remain sensitive to the constantly evolving relationship between media. 
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 Since this inquiry is designed to estimate the availability of corrective 
speech, which invariably occurs after the allegedly defamatory speech, 
courts should not determine the means of response open to the plaintiff in 
reference to his capabilities before the defendant’s statement or even simul-
taneously with its publication. Instead, courts should compare the medium 
employed by the alleged defamer to the plaintiff’s post-publication coun-
terspeech options. This distinction will typically prove relevant only when 
a potentially defamatory publication launches its purported victim from 
relative obscurity to considerable public attention. Under such circum-
stances, the court’s consideration of pre- rather than post-publication 
means of response could prove dispositive.184 
 Second, courts should consider the notoriety of both the plaintiff and 
the defendant. The determination of each party’s status under this factor 
would prove similar to the public figure determination under the current 
defamation framework. But rather than looking only to the plaintiff’s 
status, this comparative evaluation considers both parties, accounting for 
the variety of potential defamation defendants. Under this factor, actual 
malice is appropriate not only when the plaintiff enjoys greater renown or 
otherwise qualifies as a public figure—for instance when a celebrity brings 
suit against the operator of a small website—but also when the two parties 
are of relatively equally public status—think of the typical internet mes-
sage board flame war.185 If the defendant’s public status greatly overshad-
ows the plaintiff’s—consider as an example the falsely accused Olympic 
bomber Richard Jewell’s case against a major newspaper186—then this fac-
tor would weigh in favor of permitting the negligence standard.187 Unless 
the defendant enjoys considerable notoriety advantage, this factor should 
favor requiring actual malice; otherwise those who qualify as public figures 
under the current doctrine may escape the actual malice requirement when 
they bring suit against major media providers. 
 Relative notoriety is important not only because it helps courts remain 
cognizant of the widely varying status of parties to defamation suits, but 
also because it incorporates the other rationale that justifies our current 
                                                                                                                          
 184. Although the current actual malice framework denies defendants the ability to create their 
own defense by claiming that their allegedly defamatory publication establishes the plaintiff’s public 
status, see, e.g., Hutchison v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 135 (1979), the relative access test—both by the 
point in reference to which response options are measured and by the explicit consideration of the 
defendant’s efforts to encourage counterspeech—allows the defendant’s actions to influence the 
applicability of actual malice. 
 185. A flame war is a series of “messages that are deliberately hostile and insulting” in an internet 
discussion group, usenet, or on mailing lists. See Flaming, http://en.wikipedia.org/w/ 
index.php?title=Flaming&oldid=41316441 (last visited April 21, 2006). 
 186. See generally, Jewell v. Atlanta Journal-Constitution, 2002 Ga. LEXIS 104 (Ga. 2002). 
 187. Since the relative access test is meant solely to displace the public figure test, those who 
qualify as public officials under Sullivan would be unable to rely on the greater media presence of their 
alleged defamers regardless of the limited notoriety of many public officials. 
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defamation scheme—the voluntary assumption of risk. The current defa-
mation framework reduces protection for those who attain public status on 
the basis of voluntary exposure to public criticism; similarly, consideration 
of the parties’ relative notoriety increases the plaintiff’s burden when she 
enjoys greater renown.  
 In addition to the public status of the parties and the forms of media 
available to them, courts must further consider the parties’ access to the 
relevant audience. To serve its purpose, corrective speech need not reach 
each and every individual exposed to a defamatory publication. In many 
cases, the reputational harm suffered by the alleged victim is concentrated 
among a small subset of the total audience. In large part, access to this 
relevant audience determines the plaintiff’s ability to correct any damage to 
her reputation. Despite an inability to reach the broad audience of a par-
ticular defamatory publication, the plaintiff may have the ability to com-
municate with the relevant segment of that audience. If the impact of the 
defendant’s statements are likely to harm the plaintiff’s reputation only 
within a limited segment of the audience, and the plaintiff has adequate 
means of reaching that audience segment, this factor should weigh in favor 
of actual malice. If, however, the impact of the defamatory statement is not 
limited to a discrete subset of the population or if the plaintiff has no spe-
cial access to the relevant subset, this factor militates against requiring ac-
tual malice.  
 Finally, courts must evaluate the significance of any steps taken by 
the plaintiff to engage in—or the defendant to encourage—corrective 
speech. A plaintiff’s good faith effort to correct the damage caused by the 
defendant’s publication by engaging in self-help should discourage the ap-
plication of actual malice, while the plaintiff’s refusal to tell her side of the 
story despite an invitation from the defendant should shift the balance to-
ward actual malice. In those cases, however, in which courts permit the 
lower negligence standard in part because of the plaintiff’s self-help ef-
forts, the court should limit recovery to those damages the plaintiff was 
unable to mitigate. 
 Additionally, the relative access standard should encourage fairness 
among both individuals and traditional media providers. Because the test 
weighs access to means of corrective speech in favor of the defendant, it 
creates a strong incentive to invite the targets of news reports, blog entries, 
and Usenet posts to respond. Not only would this practice weigh in favor 
of actual malice should a suit arise, it gives the defamed an immediate and 
satisfying method to address her concern. Most importantly, it bestows on 
the public the benefit of informed discussion. 
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B. Application of the Relative Access Standard 
 Basing the application of actual malice on relative access to the means 
of communication would enable courts to strike the appropriate balance 
between protecting reputation and free speech in the modern communica-
tions environment. By creating a standard that is at once more context-
sensitive and less context-dependent, the relative access test balances these 
competing rights better than the current public figure standard. By moving 
away from an antiquated test based on the technology of a bygone era to-
ward a standard cast in more general terms, the relative access test avoids 
the obsolescence problem faced by our current constitutional defamation 
framework. Given the likelihood of inter-media defamation suits involving 
parties with varying access to a range of media options, this approach will 
prove a better long-term solution than either the current public figure doc-
trine or a carve-out for internet speech.188 In crafting a solution to the prob-
lem created by the Gertz Court’s dated understanding of media, we must be 
careful to avoid the same fate. Internet carve-outs themselves are tied to 
particular technologies and conceptions of communications with limited 
shelf lives. The more principled solution offered by the relative access test 
guards against this sort of obsolescence.  
 The relative access test would alter the current application of the law 
in precisely those instances most in need of reform. Today, given the com-
plex and varied exchange of information, many private parties wield con-
siderable access to the channels of mass communication. A relative access 
test would require plaintiffs with sufficient access to the means of re-
sponse—those who may nonetheless qualify as private figures under the 
current framework—to demonstrate actual malice regardless of the nature 
of the issue or the type of damages sought. The relative access standard 
emphasizes the importance of a level playing field in the battle of public 
opinion, thus providing the sort of environment most conducive to unin-
hibited debate. 
 The current actual malice framework is incapable of distinguishing 
between defamation defendants. Despite the Court’s emphasis on the im-
portance of access to corrective speech in determining the appropriate fault 
standard, all suits brought by private citizens are subject to the negligence 
standard whether the defendant is a major media company like The New 
York Times or the poster of a comment on an obscure blog. Because it 
compares the modes of communication open to the plaintiff and the me-
dium used by the defendant, the relative access test can make such distinc-
tions. 
                                                                                                                          
 188. Some commentators propose requiring actual malice when the defamatory messages are 
published in an open internet forum such as bulletin board systems. See Jeremy Stone Weber, Defining 
Cyberlibel: A First Amendment Limit for Libel Suits Against Individuals Arising from Computer 
Bulletin Board Speech, 46 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 235 (1995). 
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 Consider a hypothetical defamation suit brought by a private figure 
against a major cable news network, such as Fox News, for falsely accus-
ing the plaintiff and his family of ties to terrorist organizations.189 Under 
the current public figure doctrine, this suit—as a constitutional matter—
would not require actual malice,190 and for good reason. A private figure 
like the plaintiff has little, if any, opportunity to effectively dispute the ac-
cusations made by a media outlet with the power of Fox News. In order to 
protect the private figure’s reputation and ensure responsible behavior by 
the media, the public figure doctrine recognizes the need for a less de-
manding standard of fault. Under these facts, the relative access test would 
reach the same conclusion. Because of the vast disparity between the par-
ties’ respective abilities to communicate, effective counterspeech by the 
private plaintiff is highly unlikely. Therefore, actual malice is inappropri-
ate.191  
 Imagine, however, that instead of Fox News, the defamed brought suit 
against the author of a message board post that contained similar accusa-
tions.192 Again, because of his private status, the public figure doctrine 
would require the plaintiff merely to prove negligent publication. Although 
the public figure test imposes the same degree of fault in both instances, in 
this second scenario the rationale for imposing such a low fault require-
ment breaks down. The plaintiff—who presumably read the post at  
                                                                                                                          
 189. Former Fox News contributor and Justice Department prosecutor John Loftus recently read 
the home address of a California family on the air, claiming that terrorists resided at that address, 
exposing the family to numerous violent threats. See H.G. Reza, When Blame Knocks on the Wrong 
Door; Since Fox News Wrongly Identified a La Habra Home as that of a Terrorist, its Five-Member 
Family has Faced an Angry Backlash, L.A. Times, Aug. 25, 2005, at B3.  
 190. In fact, under one reading of the Court’s Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders decision, 
states may impose strict liability under such circumstances. See infra notes 54, 102 and accompanying 
text. 
 191. If, instead, Fox News offered the family an opportunity to rebut the charges and they 
accepted, the relative access test would likely demand a showing of actual malice since the plaintiffs 
enjoyed access to the same audience through the same medium as a result of Fox’s effort to ensure “fair 
and balanced” reporting. In fact, encouraging this sort of conversation between publishers (whether 
traditional publishers or internet posters) and potential defamation victims will in many cases prevent 
the defamatory publication in the first place. Had Fox producers engaged in even the most preliminary 
discussion with the family in question, they would have likely discovered the reporting error before any 
damage occurred. Moreover, if Fox insisted on running the story after the family proffered evidence of 
its falsity, actual malice would not prove difficult to establish. 
 192. Traditionally, suits brought by private plaintiffs against non-media defendants are 
uncommon. Nonetheless, changes in both law and technology increase the chances of these suits in the 
future. The access to the means of mass communication enjoyed by individual internet users increases 
the likelihood that nonmedia publishers will disseminate information thought to defame potential 
plaintiffs. The two-way nature of most internet communication increases the likelihood of potentially 
defamatory exchanges between private parties. Further, because of the potentially large audience for 
these exchanges, the likelihood of damages significant enough to warrant litigation increases. Finally, 
because § 230 shields ISPs and other deep-pocketed republishers from liability, non-media entities will 
often present the only viable option for recovery.  
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issue193—could easily respond to his alleged defamer, correcting the mis-
statements and likely mitigating much of their harm through a few minutes 
of typing rather than protracted litigation. Under the relative access test, 
since both private parties had access to identical means of communicating 
to the same audience, the plaintiff would be required to demonstrate actual 
malice. Applied in this fashion, the relative access test would ensure that 
those acting without actual malice are free to discuss issues of concern re-
gardless of the private nature of the parties involved. It would also encour-
age those targeted by potentially defamatory speech to engage in 
discussion rather than hiring a lawyer. 
 Even when a private plaintiff is the subject of defamatory statements 
published by a mainstream media source, the relative access test may de-
part from the public figure doctrine’s imposition of the negligence stan-
dard. Imagine that The New York Times runs a story describing the possible 
rediscovery of the ivory-billed woodpecker, a species long thought ex-
tinct.194 Further imagine that the Times is skeptical of the local Arkansas 
ornithologist who claims to have located the bird, questions his methodol-
ogy, and claims that his credentials are fabricated. After publication, the 
plaintiff—who operates a blog popular within the bird-watching commu-
nity focusing on ornithological issues—files suit. Under the relative access 
test, actual malice may prove appropriate despite the apparent disparity of 
access between the parties. Since the plaintiff’s reputation is likely to be 
injured primarily within the relatively small community of ornithology en-
thusiasts195—an audience not particularly targeted by the Times—the plain-
tiff’s blog may offer a significant self-help remedy despite the comparative 
numerical insignificance of its audience. Certainly, to insist that viable cor-
rective speech requires the ornithologist to communicate with each New 
York Times reader places an impossible burden on self-help. Instead, by 
limiting the relevant audience to those readers whose opinions contribute 
directly to the plaintiff’s reputation, the relative access test strikes a rea-
sonable balance between the interest in protecting reputational integrity 
and the practical limitations of corrective speech. 
                                                                                                                          
 193. However, he may have read the post long after its initial posting. In this sense, the relative 
access test does impose some duty to police one’s own reputation since the effectiveness of corrective 
speech will be reduced over time in most cases. Given the effect of delayed response, efforts to 
purposely conceal a publication from those it may defame should therefore weigh against requiring 
actual malice under the fourth factor of the relative access test.  
 194. See, e.g., James Gorman, Ivory Bill or Not? The Proof Flits Tantalizingly Out of Sight, N.Y. 
Times, Aug. 30, 2005, at F1; Avi Salzman, A Scientist, So Sure One Day, Changes His Call the Next, 
N.Y. Times, Aug. 14, 2005, at 14CN. 
 195. The relevant audience in this case, of course, also includes the ornithologist’s friends, family, 
and local community. Assuming they read the Times article, the plaintiff likely has sufficient access to 
these audience members to engage in self-help measures. In fact, his access to many of these 
individuals will be greater than that enjoyed by the Times.  
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 Although cases such as this one demonstrate perhaps the most radical 
departure from the current public figure doctrine, the relative access test 
proves faithful to the justifications that underlie current protections for de-
famatory speech, even if it changes the outcome in some subset of cases.  
C. Potential Difficulties of Relative Access 
 The relative access test faces four major criticisms—the first doctrinal 
and the remaining three practical: (1)  it ignores the Court’s limitation of 
actual malice to publications relating to public concerns and controver-
sies,  (2)  corrective speech is ineffective,  (3)  the standard is not amenable 
to summary judgment, and  (4)  uncertainty resulting from a new standard 
will chill speech. 
 The Court has considered the public nature of the issue giving rise to 
allegedly defamatory speech in two distinct ways. In determining the plain-
tiff’s status as a limited purpose public figure, the Court inquires whether 
the plaintiff thrust himself into the vortex of a “public controversy.”196 In 
Time, Inc. v. Firestone, for example, the Court ruled that a divorce pro-
ceeding between a prominent businessman and his former wife did not 
constitute a “public controversy.” Therefore, the plaintiff ex-wife was not 
required to demonstrate actual malice in her suit against a magazine pub-
lisher for its defamatory coverage of the divorce197—despite persistent me-
dia coverage and numerous press conferences held by the plaintiff 
concerning the proceedings.198 
 Additionally, the Court limited the scope of constitutional protection 
if the issue is not of “public concern.”199 In Dun & Bradstreet, the Court 
held that in suits concerning matters that are not of public concern, punitive 
and presumed damages require no showing of actual malice.200  
 To the extent the relative access test ignores the public controversy 
and concern questions, it is inconsistent with the Court’s holdings. How-
ever, the indifference of the relative access test to issues of public contro-
versy or concern is a virtue rather than a deficiency. These questions are a 
source of persistent confusion and place courts in the untenable position of 
deciding which speech is of sufficient societal importance to gain the pro-
tection of the actual malice test and which is not.  
                                                                                                                          
 196. This language has its origin in Justice Harlan’s Curtis opinion. See supra note 41 and 
accompanying text.  
 197. 424 U.S. 448, 453-54 (1976). 
 198. Id. at 485 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 199. Arlen W. Langvardt, Media Defendants, Public Concerns, and Public Plaintiffs: Toward 
Fashioning Order from Confusion in Defamation Law, 49 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 91, 125 (1987). 
 200. Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders, 472 U.S. 749, 763 (1985). Dun & Bradstreet 
arguably left open the possibility of strict liability in suits brought by private plaintiffs over matters of 
purely private concern. See Rodney A. Smolla, Law of Defamation § 3:5 (2d ed. 1999); cf. 
Langvardt, supra note 199 (calling this reading “arguable”). 
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 Both “public controversy” and “public concern” lack precise defini-
tions.201 In fact, courts often confuse the two.202 The Court has never de-
fined a “public controversy” in the context of defamation—explaining only 
that “a libel defendant must show more than mere newsworthiness.”203 Nor 
does the Court’s explanation that “[w]hether . . . speech addresses a matter 
of public concern must be determined by [the expression’s] content, form, 
and context . . . as revealed by the whole record”204 offer courts or litigants 
any valuable guidance.205 
 Moreover, basing the requirement of actual malice either in whole or 
in part on a determination of whether the subject matter of a publication is 
a public controversy would “forc[e] state and federal judges to decide on 
an ad hoc basis which publications address issues of ‘general or public in-
terest’ and which do not—and to determine . . . ‘what information is rele-
vant to self-government.’”206 The Gertz Court “doubt[ed] the wisdom of 
committing this task to the conscience of judges.”207 The task of separating 
the socially valuable wheat from the prating chaff is one better left to the 
public than the judiciary. Focusing on the public nature of the issue simply 
“resurrects the precise difficulties that . . . Gertz was designed to avoid.”208 
By jettisoning these inquiries, the relative access test allows courts to avoid 
deciding the murky and dangerous question of the relative value of speech, 
and instead determine fault standards in a manner that ensures a level play-
ing field for competing ideas.209 
 The effectiveness of corrective speech in mitigating the harmful effect 
of defamatory speech presents another difficulty. Counterspeech cannot 
guarantee that victims of defamation will avoid or repair all harm to their 
reputations. Nor need it. Self-help measures invariably sacrifice efficiency 
in exchange for protecting other highly valued interests.210 In the defama-
tion context, while neither monetary compensation nor self-help efforts can 
fully repair reputational harms, a favorable judgment may provide a more 
                                                                                                                          
 201. See C.W., Note, Defining a Public Controversy in the Constitutional Law of Defamation, 69 
Va. L. Rev. 931 (1983) (discussing the ambiguity of “public controversy”); Langvardt, supra note 199, 
at 125-32. 
 202. See C.W, supra note 201, at 945. 
 203. Wolston v. Reader’s Digest Ass’n, 443 U.S. 157, 167 (1979). 
 204. Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 761 (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147-48 
(1983)). 
 205. See Langvardt, supra note 199, at 125-32. 
 206. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 346 (quoting Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 79 (Marshall, J., dissenting)). 
 207. Id. at 346. 
 208. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 487 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 209. Of course, the public concern inquiry could remain an independent consideration that limits 
the application of the actual malice requirement. Such an approach would create a two-part test for 
requiring actual malice. First the court would determine if the issue was of public concern. If so, actual 
malice would be required unless the plaintiff demonstrated substantial inequality in access to the means 
of response.  
 210. See Lichtman, supra note 78, at 10.  
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complete recovery for defamation victims than could a self-help remedy. 
The relative access test tolerates some level of harm to defamation vic-
tims—the level of harm that cannot be avoided by corrective speech—in 
order to encourage free debate. First Amendment jurisprudence presup-
poses that the truth is most likely to emerge from unfettered discussion. As 
Learned Hand explained, “to many this is, and always will be, folly; but we 
have staked upon it our all.”211 If this assumption is well founded, correc-
tive speech offers an effective remedy to those subjected to injurious false-
hoods, and as discussed above, studies demonstrate that corrective speech 
does exhibit some mitigating effect.212  
 Third, although the inquiries required by the relative access test are 
complicated, they are unlikely to preclude summary judgment. Courts are 
often expected to dispose of questions of similar complexity at the sum-
mary judgment level. Copyright’s fair use doctrine,213 for example, while 
far from a model of doctrinal clarity, presents a mixed question of law and 
fact that, nonetheless, can be resolved on summary judgment.214 Among the 
seemingly factually intensive factors courts must weigh are the effects of 
the defendant’s use on the market for the product or the value of the plain-
tiff’s work,215 and the amount and substantiality of the portion of the copy-
righted work used by the defendant.216  
 The current actual malice standard is itself one less than ideally cali-
brated for summary adjudication.217 But despite the seemingly fact-
intensive inquiries required to determine the satisfaction of actual malice, 
courts frequently manage to decide these suits on summary judgment. 
States like California have even adopted Anti-SLAPP statutes, which have 
made an art out of disposing of defamation suits at an early procedural 
stage.218 Given courts’ demonstrated ability to resolve similarly fact-
intensive inquiries at early procedural stages, the introduction of the rela-
tive access test proposed here is unlikely to eliminate the availability of 
summary judgment.  
 Furthermore, the public figure distinction itself is hardly a simple 
standard to apply. As one court explained, “[d]efining public figures is 
                                                                                                                          
 211. United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943), aff’d, 326 U.S. 1 
(1945)). 
 212. See Calvert & Richards, supra note 57. 
 213. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2005). 
 214. Harper & Row, Pub., Inc. v. Nation Enters., Inc., 471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985). 
 215. § 107(4). 
 216. § 107(3). 
 217. Hutchison v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 120 n.9 (1979) (“The proof of ‘actual malice’ calls a 
defendant’s state of mind into question and does not readily lend itself to summary disposition.”) 
(internal citations omitted). 
 218. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16-17 (West 2006); Cal. Civ. Code § 47 (West 1998). 
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much like trying to nail a jellyfish to the wall.”219 Nonetheless, courts rou-
tinely decide public figure status on summary judgment. Courts would cer-
tainly face some initial difficulty in applying the relative access test, but 
the questions it presents are no less amenable to summary judgment than 
questions routinely faced by courts.  
 Finally, it may be argued that by introducing a new multifactor test for 
applying actual malice, the relative access approach will introduce uncer-
tainty likely to chill speech. Though the adoption of a new test may ini-
tially provoke caution among speakers until the precise contours of the 
doctrine emerge, any uncertainty arising from the relative access test would 
likely dissipate quickly. Since the overall shift achieved by this new stan-
dard would favor speakers—requiring a showing of actual malice in more 
instances that the current public figure doctrine—significant chilling of 
speech is unlikely. In fact, because the relative access test would generally 
place new burdens on plaintiffs, any resulting uncertainty may chill libel 
litigation rather than speech.  
 The transition to a relative access test for defamation would prove 
challenging. Nonetheless, this test offers significant benefits well worth the 
growing pains it may induce. As time passes and our communications en-
vironment continues to drift further from the one that formed the basis of 
our current defamation framework, the move to such a test will grow both 
more necessary and more difficult. 
Conclusion 
 The public figure doctrine—the current constitutional framework for 
determining the applicability of the actual malice standard for defama-
tion—is the product of an increasingly outmoded understanding of the 
communications environment. Democratization of the means of communi-
cation spurred by the internet has called into question the assumptions that 
informed the Court’s formulation of the public figure test. As a result, cur-
rent First Amendment protections lack the granularity necessary to dis-
criminate between wide varieties of potential defamation defendants.  
 Conditioning the actual malice requirement on the parties’ relative 
access to corrective speech provides increased sensitivity to variations in 
circumstance that are likely to arise in today’s communications environ-
ment. Moreover, the relative access standard does so while remaining faith-
ful to the rationale that initially gave rise to the public figure 
doctrine: rather than seek to recover monetary damages to repair their repu-
tations, those who are able to meaningfully respond to potentially harmful 
misstatements are obligated by the First Amendment to seek self-help. 
                                                                                                                          
 219. Rosanova v. Playboy Enters., Inc, 411 F. Supp. 440, 443 (S.D. Ga. 1976), aff’d 580 F.2d 859 
(5th Cir. 1978). 
